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Abstract
Approval-preferential voting is problematical since it combines two
different kinds of information that could by themselves lead to dif-
ferent choices. This article analyses the problem and studies a new
proposal to deal with it. The existing methods are overviewed with
special attention to several desirable properties that are not always
met. Particular emphasis is made on certain rather unknown views
of Condorcet about this subject. The proposed procedure definitely
aims for a choice in the spirit of approval voting. However, it still
makes use of the preferential information so as to improve the ap-
proval one. This is done by means of the path scores, in common to
Schulze’s method for preferential voting. The resulting method, that
we call path-revised approval choice, is shown to enjoy several good
properties. In particular, it fulfils in a well-defined sense Condorcet’s
latest view that a surely good option should prevail over a doubtfully
best one.
Il meglio e` nemico del bene
(Orlando Pescetti, 1603, Proverbi Italiani)
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0 Introduction
Suppose that two alternative proposals a and b are submitted to a decision-
making body formed by 100 members. Each member is asked whether he
approves of a or not, likewise about b, and whether he prefers a to b or
viceversa. Assume that the votes are as follows:
25 : a | b , 35 : b>a | , 40 : | b>a , (1)
where the numbers mean quantities of voters, x>y means that x is preferred
to y , and a bar indicates that the options at its left are approved and those
at its right are disapproved. In other words, (1) means that 25 voters approve
of a and disapprove of b, 35 prefer a to b while approving of both, and 40
disapprove of both while still preferring a over b. Which decision should be
taken as a result of these votes?
Notice that proposal a is approved by a majority of 60%, whereas b
is disapproved by a majority of 65%. From this point of view, it makes
sense to go for proposal a. However, one can also check that a majority of
75% prefers b to a, which advises against choosing a. Should one let the
preferential information prevail? Or should it be dismissed in favour of the
approval information?
The situation is very much that of a Condorcet cycle of collective pref-
erences (see for instance Laslier 2004, § 2.3). In fact, approving a proposal
can be interpreted as preferring it to a certain implicit option that we shall
refer to as default. This default option can be identified with the status quo,
i. e. leaving things as they are. Alternatively, one could think of it as an
abstract boundary between good and bad options. Anyway, under such an
interpretation the approval-preferential vote (1) about a and b can be viewed
as the following purely preferential vote about a, b and 0, where 0 denotes
the default option:
25 : a>0>b , 35 : b>a>0 , 40 : 0>b>a . (2)
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From this perspective, the remarks made in the preceding paragraph corre-
spond indeed to a Condorcet cycle, namely a>0>b>a. Such cycles are not
just an academic possibility, but they have occurred in practice, as in the
two-choice referendum that was held in the canton of Bern on 28 November
2004 (Bochsler 2010; see also § 2.5.2 below).
This point of view leads to consider the different methods that have been
devised for dealing with preferential voting and the problem of cyclic col-
lective preferences (see for instance Tideman 2006, Ch. 13). However, most
if not all of these methods abide by the premise of neutrality, i. e. an equal
treatment of all options, which does not apply to the present case. In fact,
be it the status quo or an abstract boundary between good and bad options,
the reference option plays a special role that justifies a different treatment.
So the question remains of how to make a choice through approval-
preferential voting. In this article we will deal with this problem in a general
setting. We will start by overviewing the existing methods. This is done in
Section 1, which is also aimed at pointing out several desirable properties
that are not always satisfied. This will motivate a method that made its
appearance in Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014, § 7.2 (in a different but equiva-
lent formulation) and whose study is deepened here. We will refer to it and
its outcomes —possibly more than one in the event of certain ties— as the
path-revised approval choice(s) (Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014 use the terms
‘goodness method’ and ‘goodness winners’). This method will be developed
in Section 2. As we will see, it has several good properties, most of which are
obtained for the first time in this article. One of these properties is very much
in the spirit of Condorcet’s last views on elections —rather unknown and in
conflict with his celebrated earlier principle— namely that a surely good op-
tion should prevail over a doubtfully best one. The mathematical proofs of
the new properties are given in appendix A.
By the way, as we will see in §2.3, in the particular case of (1) the path-
revised approval choice will be the default option, i. e. the status quo.
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1 Existing methods and desirable properties
1.1 The Swiss multiple-choice referendum procedures
An interesting real example of approval-preferential voting is provided by
multiple-choice referenda as they are conducted in the Swiss Confederation
and its cantons. More specifically, approval-preferential voting arises in two
cases: (a) popular initiatives, in which case the government can put forward
a counter-proposal; and (b) the so-called ‘constructive’ referenda —in use in
only a few cantons— where a proposal from the government can be followed
by one or more counter-proposals from groups of voters.
In these cases, the voters are asked two sets of questions. The main set is
about every proposal by itself to see whether the voter approves it or not. For
a proposal to be adopted it must receive more approvals than disapprovals.
In the event of more than one proposal satisfying this condition, a choice is
made on the basis of the answers to the second set of questions, where the
voter is asked to express his preferences between the different proposals.
In the more frequent case of two proposals, the second part reduces to a
single question, namely which of the two proposals is preferred to the other.
This information determines which option is chosen when both proposals
satisfy the condition of having more approvals than disapprovals. This pro-
cedure was put forward by Christoph Haab (1976) and was adopted at the
federal level in 1987 (see Lutz, Strohmann 1998, p. 165).
In example (1) this procedure chooses proposal a, since it is the only
one with more approvals than disapprovals. In fact, a has 60 approvals and
40 disapprovals, whereas b has 35 approvals and 65 disapprovals.
For more than two proposals —which may be the case in constructive
referenda— it can happen that three or more of the proposals satisfy the
condition of having more approvals than disappovals. In this case, the prob-
lem arises of how to choose between them on the basis of the preferential
information. In the cantons of Bern and Nidwalden, this is done by means
of the Copeland rule (Tideman 2006, p. 206–209) restricted to the set of ap-
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proved options. More specifically, the choice is made on the basis of the
number of victories against the other approved options (x is considered to
beat y when there are more voters who prefer x to y than viceversa). If nec-
essary, a tiebreaker is also used. In Bern, the tiebreaker is the total number of
favourable votes in the preference comparisons against all the other proposals
(Bern, 2012, Art. 139.7). In Nidwalden, the tiebreaker is the number of ap-
provals minus the number of disapprovals (Nidwalden, 1997–2013, Art. 44.3).
Such procedures will be referred to as Swiss Procedures.
1.2 The ranking approach: rank all options, including
the default one, then take the top one
Another interesting real case of approval-preferential voting is the voting
procedure used by the Debian Project (1998–2007; see also Voss 2012).
Since 1998, the votes of this organization systematically include a default
option to mark the boundary between approved and disapproved options. In
fact, their regulations explicitly state that “Options which the voters rank
above the default option are options they find acceptable. Options ranked
below the default options are options they find unacceptable” (Debian 1998–
2007, v 1.1, §A.6). In practice, the default option is usually described as
“further discussion” or “none of the above”.
By the way, the idea of systematically including such an option was al-
ready clearly stated by Charles L. Dodgson, alias Lewis Carroll, in the fol-
lowing way: “where ‘no Election’ is allowable, the phrase should be treated
exactly as if it were the name of a candidate” (Dodgson 1873, Chap. II).
Going back to the Debian Project, the procedure that they use to make
a choice —possibly the default option— is due to Markus Schulze (2003;
2011) who introduced it in 1998 in a mailing list about election methods.
As it is shown by that author, this procedure admits of several equivalent
formulations. One of them corresponds to actually ranking all the options
and then taking the top one. We will call this option the Path-Top Choice,
since this ranking is based on the so-called path scores. These scores will be
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dealt with in detail in Section 2.2, for they will also be a crucial tool of our
proposal.
Instead of that particular ranking method, one can consider any other
method for selecting a best or topmost option in a preferential vote, with the
only peculiarity that one of the options is the default one. Among such meth-
ods, one can consider the Borda count, the method of Condorcet-Keme´ny-
Young , or the method of Ranked Pairs. As a general reference for these and
other methods, we refer the reader to Tideman 2006, Ch. 13.
Except for the Borda count, all of the other methods mentioned in the two
preceding paragraphs comply with the Condorcet principle. That is, they
choose the Condorcet winner whenever it exists. Recall that a Condorcet
winner means an option x that beats every other option y in the sense that
a majority of voters prefer x to y .
For three options (one of them being the default one) and fully completed
ballots, all of the above-mentioned Condorcet-compliant methods amount to
resolving any Condorcet cycle by dropping the weakest, i. e. less supported,
of the three majoritarian views in conflict. In the case of example (1), this
means dropping the view of approving a, which leads to adopting the default
option 0.
So these methods allow strongly supported preferences to overturn the
approval information.
1.3 Should a small preference differential prevail over
a large approval differential?
However, we might be giving too much importance to preferences. Con-
sider, for instance, the following example (from Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014,
eq. (109)):
1
2
+ ǫ : a>b | , 1
2
− ǫ : b | a , (3)
where the numbers of voters are normalized to add up to one and ǫ is a small
positive quantity (before the normalization the votes could be, for instance,
500 001 : a>b | and 500 000 : b | a). As one can see, both a and b are ap-
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proved —i. e. preferred to 0— by a majority of voters; besides, a is preferred
to b also by a majority. So a is a Condorcet winner, and therefore it will be
chosen by the above Condorcet-compliant methods. However, the majority
that approves a and prefers it to b is quite slight, whereas b is approved
by a whole unanimity. So, we are allowing a tiny preference differential to
overcome a huge approval differential.
As one can easily check, the Swiss procedures also choose a.
Examples like this suggest that one should perhaps completely forget
about preferences and take into account only the approval information.
For later reference, we will refer to this course of action as the Approval
Choice procedure. More precisely, we will take the general view that not
approving an option is not the same as disapproving it, in which case it
is appropriate to abide by the number of approvals minus the number of
disapprovals and to choose the option that maximizes this difference (see for
instance Felsenthal 1989). This includes the more classical particular case
where the ballots allow to express approvals but not disapprovals, in which
case the above-mentioned difference reduces to the number of approvals.
Notice that in the general case where disapprovals are also expressed that
difference could be negative for all non-default options, in which case it makes
sense to declare a void choice, i. e. to choose the default option.
Having said that, it still seems that there should be a sensible way to
refine the approval choice by making use of any preferential information that
could exist as a complement of the approval-disapproval one. However, it is
not clear how should one proceed to blend both kinds of information together.
1.4 Condorcet’s last views on elections
The point that we are leading to was formulated by Condorcet in the follow-
ing way (Condorcet 1789, §XIII, p. 307; McLean, Hewitt 1994, p. 177–178;
emphasis is ours):
“It is generally more important to be sure of electing men who
are worthy of holding office than to have a small probability of
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electing the worthiest man.”
The latest works of Condorcet on voting and elections, from 1788 to his death
in 1794, are indeed dominated by this idea and by the aim of being able to
deal with a large number of candidates, in which case paired comparisons
become rather cumbersome (Cre´pel 1990; McLean, Hewitt 1994).
Concerning the meaning of ‘being sure’ and ‘probability’, in another place
Condorcet says the following (Condorcet 1788, §XIII, p. 193; McLean, He-
witt 1994, p. 139):
“We consider a proposition asserted by 15 people, say, more prob-
able than its contradictory asserted by only 10.”
So he identifies the probability of a proposition —such as ‘x is worthy’—
with the support for it in the vote.
In the same spirit as example (3), Condorcet gives the following one
(Cre´pel 1990, p. 34–35; McLean, Hewitt 1994, p. 241):
5 : a>c>... | ..., 4 : b>c>... | ..., (4)
where he assumes a large number of candidates and, although he does not
use approval bars, he explicitly says that all voters consider c worthy of the
place. So a is considered the worthiest candidate by a slight majority, but
c is considered worthy by unanimity, and so it might be a more appropriate
choice than a (especially if the latter were disapproved by the second set
of voters). By the way, this and other examples show that Condorcet was
accepting the possibility of making a choice different from the Condorcet
winner.
1.5 Condorcet’s practical methods
The methods that Condorcet proposed in connection with the preceding ideas
are often referred to as Condorcet’s “practical” methods. In general terms,
there are two of them. In both cases, the voter is required to produce an
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ordered list of approved candidates. Unlike proper approval voting, however,
the length of this list is fixed (Condorcet 1788, p. 203; McLean, Hewitt 1994,
p. 143):
“It should not be too short, to give a good chance that one of the
candidates will obtain a majority, [...] nor should it be too long,
[so that] the voters can still complete the list without having to
nominate candidates they consider unworthy.”
In his first practical proposal, formulated in 1788, Condorcet chooses
the most approved candidate, conditioned to having obtained a majority,
and the preferential information is used only in the event of ties (Condorcet
1788, Article V, p. 193–211; translated in McLean, Hewitt 1994, p. 139–147).
If no candidate has a majority of approvals, then he simply proposes to run
a second round after having asked the voters to extend their lists with a
certain number of additional candidates. So this proposal was very much in
the spirit of approval voting.
In his second and final practical proposal, formulated in 1789 and yet,
with some variations, in 1793, Condorcet makes a more substantial use of
the preferential information (Condorcet 1789, 1793). More specifically, his
last work contains the following wording (within a more complex multiround
procedure; Cre´pel 1990, p. 41–42, §VI; McLean, Hewitt 1994, p. 249–250,
§VI):
“If one candidate has the absolute majority of first votes, he will
be elected. If one candidate has the absolute majority of first
votes and second votes together, he will be elected. If several
candidates obtain this majority, the one with the most votes will
be preferred. If one candidate has the absolute majority of the
three votes together, he will be elected, and if several candidates
obtain this majority, the one with the most votes will be preferred.”
By the context it is clear that the number of first (resp. second) votes means
the number of ballots where that candidate is ranked first (resp. second).
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Here Condorcet had limited the preferential vote to three candidates, but in
the following round [ibidem, §VIII] he extends this rule to preferential votes
that list six candidates.
Except for secondary variations, this idea spread and/or was rediscov-
ered several times. Shortly after Condorcet’s proposal, it was adopted in
Geneva, where it was analyzed by Simon Lhuilier (1794). Later on, in the
beginning of the twentieth century it was adopted by several American in-
stitutions, starting from the city of Grand Junction (Colorado, USA), where
this method was introduced by James W. Bucklin (see Hoag, Hallett 1926,
§ 278). Another example of its use are ballroom dancing competitions, where
this idea is used since 1947/48 under the name of Skating System in order
to combine the rankings given by the different adjudicators (Dawson 1963).
More recently, it was proposed again by Murat R. Sertel in 1986 under the
name of Majoritarian Compromise (see Sanver 2010).
Having said that, both the Skating System and Sertel’s Majoritarian
Compromise are not, properly speaking, about approval-preferential voting.
In fact, they completely ignore the approval aspect, which amounts to pro-
ceed as if all options were approved by all voters. This is also the case of
Tideman’s (2006, p. 203–206) presentation under the name of ‘Bucklin Sys-
tem’.
As we have seen at the beginning of this subsection, Condorcet considered
only the top part of each voter’s ranking, from the first position to a certain
pre-established rank, with the hope that all of these options had the approval
of the voter.
In contrast, in Hoag and Hallett’s (1926, § 278) presentation of Bucklin’s
idea each voter is assumed to give a truncated ranking of an arbitrary length,
which ranking is implicitly assumed to be limited to options that meet the
approval of that voter. Anyway, the procedure remains as it is stated in
the above quote of Condorcet except for its going on beyond third options.
This general version is considered also by Sanver (2010), who, on the basis of
Sertel’s terminology, calls itMajoritarian Approval Compromise. On account
of its origins, we will refer to it as the Condorcet-Bucklin procedure (credit
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to Condorcet is already acknowledged in Hoag, Hallett 1926, p. 490).
Even in this more general form, this procedure is unable to take into
account any information about the voter’s preferences between non-approved
options. So when applying it to such cases as (1) and (3) one can begin by
throwing away any information that might appear at the right of the bars.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Condorcet-Bucklin choice will
always be approved by an absolute majority of the voters. If no option
satisfies this condition, then the Condorcet-Bucklin choice is not a proper
option, but the default one (as if the latter had been appended at the end of
every voter’s truncated ranking).
As one can easily check, in the case of example (1), the Condorcet-Bucklin
procedure chooses option a, which is the only one that is approved by a
majority. In example (3) with ǫ > 0 it chooses also option a, in spite of
the fact that this option is approved only by a slight majority, whereas b is
approved by unanimity. So the Condorcet-Bucklin procedure does not fulfil
Condorcet’s own last thinking (§ 1.4) that clearly good options should be
favoured over doubtfully good ones.
1.6 The Instant Runoff procedure and the issue of
monotonicity
A real example where (possibly) truncated rankings are used and where they
can be interpreted as ordered lists of approved options is the Irish presidential
election. In 1937 the Constitution of Ireland established that this election
shall use the one-seat version of the single transferable vote. This procedure
is known as Instant Runoff or Alternative Vote (Hoag, Hallett 1926, § 277;
Tideman 2006, p. 193–195). It proceeds by successive elimination. At every
step, each of the options that stay on is evaluated by counting how many
ballot papers show that option in first position. If this count is larger than
one half of the non-empty ballot papers, the option in question becomes
chosen. Otherwise, the option with the lowest count is eliminated and the
same process is repeated after having cancelled this option on all ballot papers
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(which may cause some of them to become empty).
At present, this procedure is also used in the elections to the Legisla-
tive Assemblies of two states / territories from Australia, namely, New South
Wales, since 1980, and the Northern Territory, since 2016, both of which use
one-seat constituencies.
As it is well known, a major flaw of this system is its lack of monotonicity
(see for instance Tideman 2006, p. 194). More specifically, they can exhibit
the following behaviour: An option a that is chosen from a certain set of
ballots can cease to be chosen if one ballot of the form b > a ... is changed
into a > b ..., where the dots stand for exactly the same content in both
cases. So a ceases to win because of having been raised in one of the ballots!
This is certainly quite undesirable.
One could argue that monotonicity is not important in practice, because
a real election is about a particular set of ballots and not about any variation
of them. However, a lack of monotonicity can be seen as an evidence that
the results are somehow wrong, either before the variation or afterwards (or
in both cases).
1.7 Upper semicontinuity: changes imply ties
Like monotonicity, the issue that we are about to raise is also about varying
the profile of a vote. By the profile of a vote we mean a specification of
how many ballots were cast of each possible kind, that is, a specification of
the form of (1) or (3) (on the understanding that no ballots have been cast
of any other kind than shown). Instead of giving the absolute frequencies, as
in (1), one can give the relative ones, as in (3).
Let us look at the effect of varying ǫ in example (3). As we have seen, the
Swiss procedures choose option a for ǫ > 0 and it is easily checked that they
choose b for ǫ ≤ 0. We claim that this is not right: if the result must change
from a to b, which are clear choices respectively for ǫ = 1
2
and ǫ = − 1
2
,
then somewhere in between both a and b should have the same merit, and
therefore, a tie between them should be admitted for that value of ǫ.
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This condition is easily violated by the methods that successively apply
different criteria, like the Swiss procedures. In an attempt to fix it, one can
consider modifying them by replacing proper majority requirements by weak
ones (greater than or equal to 50%). This achieves the desired result in the
particular case of (3), where one gets { a, b } for ǫ = 0. However, the problem
persists in other examples, like the following one:
2 + ǫ : a>b>c | , 3 : c>a>b | , 4 : | b>c>a ,
1− ǫ : a>b | c , 1 : a>c>b | , 1 : b | c>a . (5)
One can check that each of the Swiss procedures of § 1.1 chooses a for small
negative ǫ and b for small positive ǫ; at the boundary it chooses a or b
depending on whether proper majority or weak majority is considered, but
neither of both variants ever chooses {a, b} . So neither of them satisfies the
condition that we are talking about.
In general terms, this condition can be formulated in the following way,
where the output of a choice procedure is allowed to consist of several options
tied to each other. Consider a particular profile and the set of choices X
that corresponds to it according to the method in question; then, for any
other profile close enough to that one —i. e. for close enough frequencies—
the corresponding set of choices should be a subset of X . In mathematical
terms, such a property is known as ‘upper semicontinuity’.
One can argue that we are considering the profile as a continuous variable
instead of a discrete one, as it is the case in practice. However, and similarly
to the above view on monotonicity, the significance of upper semicontinuity
is not a matter of practical incidence, but one of consistency with respect to
variations of the profile.
1.8 Taking into account the preferences between non-
approved options
The methods mentioned in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 do not take into account the
preferences that a voter could have between his non-approved options. This
14 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
is unfair towards the voters who do not approve at all the chosen option and
would rather prefer some other of their non-approved options.
In order to take into account all preferences one could certainly use the
methods of Section 1.2 after having introduced a default option. By the way,
one could include among them the Condorcet-Bucklin method for complete
rankings (which in the case of (1) chooses neither a nor 0, but b!). However,
as we raised in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, this approach is too preference-oriented;
instead, one should give some sort of priority to the approval information.
The existing proposals in this direction are essentially some more elabo-
rated versions of the Swiss procedures that we presented in Section 1.1.
One of them is the Preference-Approval Voting procedure that was put
forward by Steven Brams and Remzi Sanver (2009; see also Brams 2008).
When two or more options are approved by a majority, this procedure re-
stricts the attention to these options and the preferential information about
them is used to single out, if possible, their Condorcet winner; if this is not
possible, then all options in their so-called top cycle are considered and their
approval winner is chosen. (For a given subset S of options —here we are
considering the majority-approved ones— its top cycle is the minimal X ⊆ S
such that every x ∈ X beats any y ∈ S \X in the sense that a majority of
voters prefer x to y ; see for instance Brandt, Brill, Harrenstein 2016, § 3.3
and 3.5).
A simpler possibility is the Approval Voting with a Runoff , considered
by Remzi Sanver (2010). Here, the preferences are used only to compare
between the two most approved options.
Anyway, in the case of (3) both these procedures keep choosing a for
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, like the Swiss procedures, against the view expressed
in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 that an overwhelming approval for an option should
prevail over a slightly majoritarian preference for another.
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1.9 Dealing with ties and with incomplete information
In practice, voters often do not have an opinion on some options. Besides,
they may also rank equally some of them that they do know. In order
to properly deal with such possibilities, one must begin by distinguishing
between them when interpreting the ballots.
In this connection, the Debian voting rules state that “Unranked options
are considered to be ranked equally with one another” (Debian 1998–2007,
§A.6.1). However, this is really questionable. In Condorcet’s words (Con-
dorcet 1788, p. 194; McLean, Hewitt 1994, p. 139):
“When someone votes for one particular candidate, he simply as-
serts that he considers that candidate better than the others,
and makes no assertion whatsoever about the respective merits
of these other candidates. His judgement is therefore incomplete.”
A vote where two options x and y are really ranked equally with each
other can be assimilated to half a vote where x is preferred to y together
with half another vote with the reverse preference. In contrast, a vote that
expresses neither a preference nor a tie between x and y should contribute
neither to the number of voters who prefer x to y nor to the number of those
who prefer y to x.
Usually one takes the view that “Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options” (Debian 1998–2007, §A.6.1). However, in some
contexts it could be more appropriate to interpret that no comparison is
made between a ranked option and an unranked one.
One should also be aware that not approving an option is not the same
as really disapproving it.
On account of all these considerations, it is certainly desirable that the
ballots be designed so as to make as clear as possible what the voter really
means to say (no matter whether he is being sincere or not). Besides, it is
most important to clearly specify how will the ballots be interpreted.
Once the information has been properly interpreted and collected, the
problem remains of how should one deal with it. In fact, many existing
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methods assume that complete information is given, and quite often it is not
clear at all how should they be extended to the general incomplete case.
1.10 The path heuristic
Let us look once more at example (1). Should a be approved or not? We cer-
tainly have an argument to approve a: Simply, this view is supported by 60%
of the voters, certainly more than the 40% who support the contrary view.
However, we can still produce an argument for disapproving a: In fact, the
statement that a is less preferable than b is supported by 75% of the voters,
and the statement that b is disapproved, i.e. less preferable than the default
option, is supported by 65% of the voters. So we have two statements with
the following properties: their conjunction entails disapproving a, and both
of them are supported more strongly than that 60% in favour of approving a.
Somehow this provides an argument for disapproving a with a ‘strength’ of
min(75%, 65%) = 65% > 60%. Of course, we should allow for any analogous
argument that might help towards approving a. However, in this particular
example no such argument improves upon the original support of 60%. So
we end up with a being disapproved by 65% to 60%.
As we shall see, this idea leads to a procedure, the Path-Revised Approval
Choice, that meets all the requirements that we have been pointing out in
the preceding sections.
2 The path-revised approval choice
2.1 The original preference scores
We assume a finite set of options A. The outcome of a procedure will be a
subset of A. Ordered pairs of options will be denoted by juxtaposition; so xy
means the ordered pair whose first element is x and whose second element
is y .
Our starting point are the preference scores, a. k. a. paired-comparison
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scores, that is the numbers of voters who expressed a preference for x over y ,
where x and y vary over all ordered pairs of different options. These numbers
will be denoted by Vxy .
Consider, for instance, the case of example (1). As we have been saying, a
proposal x being approved amounts to it being preferred to a certain default
option 0. By taking this into account, the profile (1) results in the preference
scores that are shown below in (6). Since we are interested only in pairs
xy with x 6= y , we use the diagonal cells for specifying the simultaneous
labelling of rows and columns by the existing options; so the cell located in
row x and column y gives information about the preference of x over y .
(Vxy) =
a 25 60
75 b 35
40 65 0
. (6)
In the event of ties or incomplete information, the translation of the
ballots into the preference scores should take into account the remarks that
were made in Section 1.9.
The final results will not depend on the absolute magnitude of the pref-
erence scores, but only on their relative magnitude. Therefore, it doesn’t
matter if the numbers of voters are normalized to add up to 1, as it was the
case in (3).
The whole collection of preference scores will be called the Llull matrix
of the vote (after Ramon Llull, who already made use of it in the 13th century,
see McLean, Urken 1995, Ch. 1, Section 4.2 and Ch. 3).
2.2 The path-revised preference scores
Our proposal is crucially based upon the path-revised preference scores ,
more shortly known as path scores . They can be seen as an upwards
revision of the original preference scores in the light of the logical implications
that are associated with the notion of transitivity.
More specifically, for every pair of options x and y , one considers all
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paths from x to y , i.e. all finite sequences γ = (x0, x1, ...xm) with x0 = x
and xm = y . Each such path is postulated to provide an indirect support
in favour of x being preferred to y , namely the minimum of the numbers
Vxixi+1 (0 ≤ i < m). The maximum of all these indirect supports is then
taken as the revised support in favour of x being preferable to y .
This revised support, or path score, is therefore defined by
V ∗xy = max { Vγ | γ is a path (x0, x1, ...xm) from x0 = x to xm = y }, (7)
where
Vγ = min
0≤i<m
Vxixi+1 . (8)
One easily checks that in (7) one can restrict m to be less than or equal to
the number of options. In fact, a longer path will necessarily contain some
repeated option, and deleting the portion between repetitions will always
result in a higher or equal score.
For three options the path scores are easily obtained by hand. For
instance, in the case of the Llull matrix (6) one easily finds that V ∗ab =
max (Vab,min(Va0, V0b)) = max (25,min(60, 65)) = 60. By proceeding in the
same way for all pairs of options, the table of path scores for that example
is found to be as follows:
(V ∗xy) =
a 60 60
75 b 60
65 65 0
. (9)
For more than three options, the computation of the path scores becomes
a combinatorial matter. However, there is a standard procedure for it, namely
the Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Cormen et al. 2009, § 25.2) whose computing
time grows only as N3 , where N stands for the number of options.
Once the path scores have been computed, now it is a matter of comparing
their values for opposite pairs of options, such as xy and yx. If V ∗xy is
larger than V ∗yx then we will adopt as a collective opinion the view that x
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is preferable to y . Furthermore, we will measure the confidence of this
collective opinion by the difference V ∗xy − V ∗yx (relative to the total number
of voters).
For instance, table (9) leads to adopt the view that b preferable to a with
a confidence of 75− 60 = 15, and that 0 is preferable to both a and b with
a confidence of 65− 60 = 5.
Recall that the very same rule applied to the original preference scores (6)
was leading to a cycle, namely a collectively preferred to 0, 0 collectively
preferred to b, and b collectively preferred to a. In contrast, the collective
preferences that we infer from (9) are transitive. Now, this is not a casual
fact, but a general property of the path scores:
Theorem (Schulze, 1998). If V ∗xy > V
∗
yx and V
∗
yz > V
∗
zy then V
∗
xz > V
∗
zx .
This fundamental fact was pointed out in 1998 by Markus Schulze, who gave
a proof of it in a mailing list about election methods. The proof can be found
also in (Schulze, 2003, 2011; Camps, Mora, Saumell, 2012).
In the following we shall write x ≻ y for V ∗xy > V ∗yx . In the absence of any
ties of the form V ∗xy = V
∗
yx , the transitive relation ≻ completely ranks all the
options. A natural choice is certainly the option that heads this complete
ranking (like option 0 in our running example). In the following we will refer
to it as the Path-Top Choice.
In the presence of ties, the matter becomes more involved, which leads to
a variant that we will refer to as Strong Path-Top Choice.
More precisely and generally, the path-top choices are those options x
such that x ∗ y for any y 6= x, whereas the strong path-top choices are
those options x such that x  y for any y 6= x. Here x  y stands for
V ∗xy ≥ V ∗yx and ∗ means the transitive closure of the relation  (which need
not be transitive). A more detailed account is given in §A.1.
However, our aim is not a choice of this sort, but one in the spirit of
approval voting.
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2.3 A choice in the spirit of approval voting
From now on we single out one of the options to play a special role. This
special option will be called default and it will be denoted by 0. By defini-
tion, a non-default option x being approved means that it is preferred to 0.
Similarly, x being disapproved means that 0 is preferred to x.
Instead of looking for the best option in comparison with all the others,
now we aim for the best one in comparison with the default, i. e. the best
one in terms of approval and disapproval.
Let x be a non-default option. In principle, the approval and disapproval
information about x is given by the scores Vx0 and V0x . However, in the
case of approval-preferential voting one can improve upon this information by
turning to the path scores V ∗x0 and V
∗
0x. In fact, these numbers are the result
of revising the approval and disapproval scores in the light of additional
information that is provided by the preference scores between non-default
options.
On the lines of the preceding section, an option x will be granted approval
as a collective opinion whenever the difference V ∗x0−V ∗0x is positive. Besides,
the larger this margin, the higher the confidence of this opinion. Therefore, it
makes sense to choose an option x that maximizes this confidence, i. e. that
satisfies
V ∗x0 − V ∗0x ≥ V ∗y0 − V ∗0y, for any y ∈ A \ {x}. (10)
In the following we will refer to such an option as a path-revised approval
choice, and the set formed by all of them will be denoted by X.
In the preceding paragraph we have assumed the inequality V ∗x0−V ∗0x > 0
to hold for at least one non-default option x. Such a situation will be referred
to as the proper case. In the improper case, that is when V ∗x0−V ∗0x ≤ 0 for
all x, we will take as path-revised approval choice the default option together
with any non-default option x that might exist with V ∗x0 − V ∗0x = 0. In this
case, the options contained in X are not properly approved, but they belong
to the boundary between approval and disapproval.
For our running example (1), the revised Llull matrix (9) results in V ∗a0−
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V ∗0a = V
∗
b0 − V ∗0b = −5. So, the path-revised approval choice is the default
option —the status quo— in contrast to the Swiss procedures, which choose
proposal a.
In this case the path-revised approval choice is the same as the path-top
choice. In other cases they are not the same. For instance, in § 2.5.1 we
shall see that for example (3) with 0 < ǫ < 1
2
the path-revised choice is the
unanimously approved option b, whereas the path-top choice is a.
Under the name of ‘goodness method’, Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014,
§ 7, followed a slightly different approach where the notion of approval-
disapproval was dealt with by itself, without any reference to a default option.
Besides, the approval and disapproval scores were revised only in the light
of such implications as “x being good and y being preferable to x implies
y being good”, and similarly, “x being bad and x being preferable to y
implies y being bad”, leaving aside any other implications associated with
the transitivity of preferences. Nevertheless, it turns out that the revised
approval and disapproval scores in that setting are exactly the same as in
the present one. This equivalence allows to transfer here the monotonicity
result obtained in that article.
In the following section this result is complemented with several other
properties of the path-revised approval choice.
2.4 Properties of the path-revised approval choice
This section briefly goes over the properties of the path-revised approval
choice. Except for the first item, that requires no proof, and the property
of monotonicity, whose proof is found elsewhere, the other results are new
and their mathematical proofs are given here —in Appendix A— for the first
time.
2.4.1 General domain. To begin with, the path-revised approval
choice can deal with any sort of incompleteness of information or ties in
the ballots. In particular, it takes into account any preferences of the voter
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between his non-approved options. See, for instance, the example in § 2.5.3.
2.4.2 Monotonicity (proof in Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014, Thm. 7.1 and
Cor. 7.2). If x is a path-revised approval choice and some votes are modi-
fied by solely raising x to a better position, then x remains a path-revised
approval choice.
More generally, the same conclusion holds for any modification of the
votes whereby the preference scores of the form Vxz increase or stay the same,
those of the form Vzx decrease or stay the same, and any other preference
score stays the same.
2.4.3 Upper semicontinuity (proof in §A.3). The set of path-revised
approval choices is an upper semicontinuous function of the profile in the
sense of Section 1.7. In particular, in the case of two non-default options
the path-revised approval choice cannot change from one option to the other
without somewhere in between admitting both of them.
2.4.4 Condorcet’s last desideratum (proof in §A.5). As we saw in
Section 1.4, Condorcet’s last views on elections insisted on making sure that
a good option is chosen rather than aiming for the best option but not
being so sure about it. The path-revised approval choice fulfils this goal in
the following way, where the term ‘confidence’ should be understood in the
sense of § 2.2: if x is a path-revised approval choice and y is not, then the
confidence that x is preferable to the default option is greater than or equal
to the confidence that y is preferable to x; besides, this inequality is strict
as soon as the path-revised approval choice is a proper one (i. e. it satisfies
the strict inequality V ∗x0 − V ∗0x > 0).
2.4.5 Weak Pareto consistency (proof in §A.4). Assume that the
votes have the form of truncated rankings and that they are interpreted as
it is mentioned in Section 1.9. Assume also that two different options x and
y satisfy the following condition: every voter either prefers x to y or ranks
them equally, but at least one voter strictly prefers x to y . In that case,
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y cannot be a path-revised approval choice unless x is also a path-revised
approval choice.
Instead of this property, one might have expected the stronger one that
forbids any such y to be a path-revised approval choice. For future reference
we will refer to this stronger version as strong Pareto consistency.
The reason why the path-revised approval choice satisfies only the weaker
version is because it aims only at making sure that we are choosing an option
preferable to the default one; the existing preferences between non-default
options are considered only to the extent that they can contribute to that
effect. This is clearly illustrated by example (3) with ǫ = 1
2
, where all voters
agree that both a and b are approved and that a is preferable to b (i. e. all
votes have the form a > b > 0). In this case, the preferential information
does not entail any revision of the view that both a and b are unanimously
approved. So, both a and b remain path-revised approval choices in spite of
the fact that a definitely dominates b in the sense of Pareto.
2.4.6 Comparison with other methods. Table 1 below compares the
Path-Revised Approval Choice with other methods that we have been men-
tioning in Section 1. Comparison is made in terms of a few selected proper-
ties. Proofs and counterexamples are given or referenced in Appendix A.
The first column of that table divides the methods into different ‘types’
depending on the kind of information that they assume and deal with: ‘ad’
means that only approval-disapproval information is used (any preferential
information is thrown away); ‘tr’ means that the ballot is constrained to have
the form of a truncated strict ranking of approved options; ‘g’ stands for the
general setting, meaning that the method can deal with any information
that can be represented by means of a Llull matrix after having explicitly
included the default option —in particular, these methods take into account
the preferences of a voter between his non approved options.
The column ‘Mono’ indicates which methods comply with monotonicity.
The statement of this property given in the first part of § 2.4.2 assumes that
the ballot has the form of a truncated ranking. However, for the methods
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Type Mono USC Pareto CLD
Approval Choice (§ 1.3) ad
√ √
w ×
Condorcet-Bucklin (§ 1.5) tr
√
× s ×
Instant Runoff (§ 1.6) tr ×
√
s ×
Path-Top Choice (§ 2.2 and A.1) g ×
√
w ×
Strong Path-Top Choice (§ 2.2 and A.1) g
√ √
w ×
Swiss Procedures (§ 1.1) g
√
× s ×
Preference-Approval Voting (§ 1.8) g
√
× w ×
Approval Voting with a Runoff (§ 1.8) g
√
× w ×
Path-Revised Approval Choice (§ 2) g
√ √
w
√
Table 1: Comparison of different methods for
making a choice by approval-preferential voting.
of general type, monotonicity can be understood in the more general form
stated in the second part of § 2.4.2.
The column ‘USC’ indicates which methods comply with upper semicon-
tinuity as explained in § 1.7. In this connection we recall that we are dealing
with the whole set of possible choices that can be made, which may be more
than one because of the ties that may arise in the procedure (as in the Instant
Runoff eliminations, or when selecting the two most approved options in the
Approval Voting with a Runoff).
The next column is about the properties of Pareto consistency considered
in § 2.4.5: ‘w’ means the weak version and ‘s’ means the strong one. In this
connection, the fact that both Condorcet-Bucklin and Instant Runoff satisfy
the strong version is partly due to the fact that they require the votes to be
strict truncated rankings.
Finally the ‘CLD’ column emphasizes the fact that property § 2.4.4 of the
Path-Revised Approval is in the spirit of Condorcet’s last desideratum (§ 1.4)
and has no counterpart in the other methods.
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2.5 Additional examples
2.5.1 Let us consider the vote (3), where ǫ is allowed to vary in the
interval − 1
2
≤ ǫ ≤ 1
2
. The Llull matrix and the associated margins are as
follows:
(Vxy)=
a 1
2
+ ǫ 1
2
+ ǫ
1
2
− ǫ b 1
1
2
− ǫ 0 0
, (Vxy−Vyx)=
a 2ǫ 2ǫ
−2ǫ b 1
−2ǫ −1 0
. (11)
One easily checks that the only path score that differs from the original score
is V ∗0b , which is equal to min(
1
2
− ǫ, 1
2
+ ǫ), that is 1
2
− ǫ for ǫ ≥ 0 and 1
2
+ ǫ
for ǫ ≤ 0. So the path scores and associated margins are as follows:
(V ∗xy)=
a 1
2
+ ǫ 1
2
+ ǫ
1
2
− ǫ b 1
1
2
− ǫ 1
2
− |ǫ| 0
, (V ∗xy−V ∗yx)=
a 2ǫ 2ǫ
−2ǫ b 1
2
+ |ǫ|
−2ǫ − 1
2
−|ǫ| 0
. (12)
Therefore, the unanimously approved option b is a path-revised approval
choice for any ǫ ∈ [− 1
2
,+ 1
2
] and a is also included as a path-revised approval
choice for ǫ = 1
2
. These results are exactly the same as those of the Approval
Choice, in accordance with the margins Va0−V0a and Vb0−V0b that are shown
in (10). For ǫ ≥ 0 these choices differ from the path-top ones, which reduce
to a for ǫ > 0 and admit both a and b for ǫ = 0. Remarkably enough, any
other method that appears in Table 1 chooses option a for ǫ > 0.
2.5.2 Let us look now at the Bern 2004 referendum mentioned in the
Introduction. The data given in Bochsler 2010, Table 1 contain a misprint in
one of the figures. The official data, which are published in Bern 2004, are as
follows, where a, b, 0 stand respectively for the amendment of the parliament,
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the people’s amendment, and the status quo:
(Vxy)=
a 101 586 109 812
106 863 b 104 144
102 796 106 832 0
, (Vxy−Vyx)=
a -5 277 7 016
5 277 b -2 688
-7 016 2 688 0
. (13)
The total number of voters was 225 758, which is larger than any of the
numbers Vxy + Vyx . This is due to the fact that some voters did not answer
all the questions. Anyway, the approval choice is again a. Besides, it is the
only proposal with more approval than disapproval, which entails that it is
also the choice of the Swiss procedures.
In this case, the path scores and their margins are as follows:
(V ∗xy)=
a 106 832 109 812
106 063 b 106 063
106 063 106 832 0
, (V ∗xy−V ∗yx)=
a 769 2 980
-769 b -769
-2 980 769 0
. (14)
According to the signs of these margins, a is also the path-revised choice as
well as the path-top one.
2.5.3 Next we give an example where the path-revised approval choice
is neither the approval choice nor the path-top one. This example will also
illustrate how to deal with general truncated rankings. Specifically, the votes
are as follows:
9 : a>b>c>d>0 , 1 : b>a>c>d>0 ,
1 : d>0 , 5 : a>d>0>b>c , 9 : c .
(15)
Like Debian elections (see § 1.9), we will interpret that any unranked
option is less preferred than any ranked one. However, we will not infer
anything about the preference between two unranked options. In particular,
the vote “d>0” says that any non-default option other than d is disapproved,
whereas the last vote, limited to mentioning c, says that c is approved but it
does not say anything about the approval or disapproval of the non-default
options other than c.
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By applying these rules, we get the absolute preference scores and margins
that are shown next.
(Vxy)=
a 14 15 15 15
1 b 15 10 10
9 9 c 19 19
1 6 6 d 16
1 6 6 0 0
, (Vxy−Vyx)=
a 13 6 14 14
-13 b 6 4 4
-6 -6 c 13 13
-14 -4 -13 d 16
-14 -4 -13 -16 0
. (16)
By looking at the preference scores, we see that Vax > V/2 = 25/2 for
every x 6= a. So a is a Condorcet winner. However, by inspecting the
margins we see that the approval choice is d, since this option realises the
maximum value of the margin over 0, namely 16.
In order to work out the path-revised approval choice and the path-top
one, we compute the path scores and their corresponding margins. The
resulting values are as follows:
(V ∗xy)=
a 14 15 15 15
9 b 15 15 15
9 9 c 19 19
6 6 6 d 16
6 6 6 6 0
, (V ∗xy−V ∗yx)=
a 5 6 9 9
-5 b 6 9 9
-6 -6 c 13 13
-9 -9 -13 d 10
-9 -9 -13 -10 0
. (17)
Since there are no ties of the form V ∗xy = V
∗
yx , the transitive relation ≻
(x ≻ y when V ∗xy > V ∗yx ) is a complete ranking, namely a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ 0.
So the path-top choice is a. In contrast, the path-revised approval choice is c,
which realises the maximum value for the revised margin over 0, namely 13.
So, from the point of view of the path scores, option a looks better than
any other, but the best one in comparison with the default is option c.
Notice also that the margin V ∗c0−V ∗0c is not only larger than V ∗x0−V ∗0x for
any other option x, but it is also larger than V ∗xc − V ∗cx . In other words, our
confidence that c is a good option —i. e. preferable to the default option—
is stronger than our confidence about any other option x being preferable
to c. As we have pointed out in § 2.4.4, this is a general property of the
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path-revised approval choice in the spirit of Condorcet’s last desideratum.
3 Concluding remarks
As we have seen in Section 1, some organizations do take their decisions by
means of approval-preferential voting. That is, each voter can express himself
both in terms of approval or disapproval of separate options and in terms of
preferences between them.
These two kinds of information complement each other quite suitably
from the voters’ point of view. However, it is not clear which procedure
should be used to determine the decision from a given set of votes. Some of
the existing procedures give priority to the approval information, while others
pay more attention to the preferential information. The two approaches may
easily lead to different choices. So the question of how to combine both kinds
of information is not a trivial one.
In this connection, it makes sense to take the view that approving an
option amounts to preferring it to the status quo, and that disaproving it
amounts to the contrary preference. Therefore, one can look at approval-
preferential voting as simple preferential voting about an augmented set of
options. Having said that, one must be ready to drop the usual requirement
of neutrality, since the status quo option plays a special role, which justifies
a different treatment.
More specifically, in this context there are at least two different concepts
of choice:
(A) The best option in comparison with the status quo.
(B) The best option in comparison with all the others (including the
status quo).
Like the ordinary approval choice, the path-revised approval choice is
definitely aimed only at (A). However, the existing information about the
preferences between non-default options is not thrown away. Instead, it
is used for a preliminary revision of the whole set of approval-preferential
scores. This revision is done by means of the so-called path scores, whose
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computation follows the transitivity implications.
As we have seen, the path-revised approval choice allows to deal with
any sort of incompleteness of information or ties in the ballots, which easily
arises in practice. On the other hand, it enjoys the properties of monotonicity,
upper semicontinuity and weak Pareto consistency.
Finally, the path-revised approval choice fulfils in a well-defined sense
Condorcet’s last desideratum of choosing a surely good option rather than a
doubtfully best one.
A Mathematical proofs and other technical-
ities
The first section of this appendix is devoted to a precise definition of the
methods that we call path-top choice and strong path-top choice. After that,
we will go over the different properties that are mentioned in Section 2.4. For
each property, we will substantiate its fulfilment by the path-revised approval
choice, and then we will check for it on the other methods that appear in
Table 1 of Section 2.4.6.
A.1 The path-top choices
The path scores can be used to make a choice not only in the spirit of approval
voting, but also in the spirit of looking for the best option in comparison with
all the others, without any special attention to a possible default option. In
fact, the latter was the standpoint of the original proposal made in 1998 by
Markus Schulze (2003; 2011) on the basis of path scores.
So the next developments still rely on the framework of Section 2.2. More
specifically, our starting point is the preference relation ≻ defined by
x ≻ y if and only if V ∗xy > V ∗yx. (18)
In accordance with the theorem of Section 2.2, this asymmetric relation
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is ensured to be transitive. In the absence of ties of the form V ∗xy = V
∗
yx , this
relation is also complete; so in this case ≻ totally orders all the options and
therefore defines a unique topmost option.
Generally speaking, however, the transitive relation ≻ need not be com-
plete, which makes things a little more involved. To begin with, one is led to
consider the relation  defined by the non-strict inequality V ∗xy ≥ V ∗yx. This
relation is certainly complete. However, it need not be transitive. This leads
to consider its transitive closure ∗, i. e. x ∗ y if and only if there exists
a path x0x1 . . . xm from x0 = x to xm = y such that V
∗
xixi+1
≥ V ∗xi+1xi for
all i < m. In contrast to ≻ and , the relation ∗ is ensured to be both
transitive and complete.
Since ∗ is a complete ranking, a natural choice is provided by its topmost
options, that is, the members of the set
T = { x ∈ A | x ∗ y, ∀y 6= x }. (19)
These options are what we call the path-top choices.
In the literature on tournament solutions such a set appears under the
names of weak top cycle, GETCHA set (for GEneralized Top-CHoice As-
sumption), or Smith set (see Schwartz 1986 and Brandt, Brill, Harrenstein
2016, § 3.5). Notice, however, that we are considering it for the tournament
which arises from the path scores V ∗ , and not for that which arises directly
from the original scores V .
The next statement characterizes the set of path-top choices directly in
terms of the relation ≻ instead of ∗. In this connection, we use the following
terminology: A set X of options is a dominant set for ≻ if and only if
it is not empty and it satisfies x ≻ y (i. e. V ∗xy > V ∗yx ) for all x ∈ X and
y 6∈ X . Besides, X is a minimal dominant set for ≻ if and only if it is
a dominant set for ≻ and no proper subset of X has this property.
Theorem (Schwartz 1986, Cor. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). The set of path-top choices
is the only minimal dominant set for ≻.
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Corollary. An option x is the only path-top choice if and only if it satisfies
V ∗xy > V
∗
yx for all y 6= x.
Instead of the weak top cycle of ≻, one can consider its strong top cycle,
a. k. a. GOCHA set (for Generalized Optimal CHoice Axiom), or Schwartz
set (see Schwartz 1986 and Brandt, Brill, Harrenstein 2016, § 3.5). In the
present context where ≻ is transitive, this set amounts to
S = { x ∈ A | x  y, ∀y 6= x }. (20)
Obviously, S ⊆ T, with equality whenever  is transitive. When  is not
transitive, then it does not qualify as a complete ranking, so the members of S
are doubtfully acceptable as the only topmost options. In exchange, however,
the set S performs better than T in some respects (such as monotonicity, as
we will see in §A.2), which justifies considering S as an alternative choice
set. In particular, this is the choice set adopted by Markus Schulze (2003;
2011). Here we will refer to it as the set of strong path-top choices.
A.2 Monotonicity
For ballots that have the form of truncated rankings, a choice method being
monotonic means the following: If x is a choice by that method for a given
profile, then it remains a choice when some votes of that profile are modified
by raising x to a better position without any other change. More specifically,
“raising x to a better position” means one or more of the following changes or
any sequence of them: (a) changing z > x to x > z for some z ; (b) changing
z > x to x ∼ z for some z ; (c) changing x ∼ z to x > z for some z ;
(d) changing from x not being mentioned in a truncated ranking to it being
appended at the end of it.
For the general setting, where the input can be any Llull matrix, the
preceding concept admits the the following natural generalization: x remains
a choice for any modification of the votes whereby the preference scores of
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the form Vxz increase or stay the same, those of the form Vzx decrease or
stay the same, and any other preference score stays the same.
Theorem (Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014, Thm. 7.1 and Cor. 7.2). The path-
revised approval choice is monotonic.
Remark. The standpoint of Camps, Mora, Saumell 2014, § 7, is a priori
slightly different from the one adopted here. However, both approaches lead
to exactly the same revised approval and disapproval scores —our V ∗x0 and
V ∗0x , there denoted by V
∗(gx) and V
∗(gx) and given by formulas (106) and
(107)—. This allows to transfer the above monotonicity result to the present
setting.
A.2.1 Approval Choice (§ 1.3) is monotonic
An approval choice is an option x that maximizes the value of Vx0−V0x .
Obviously, it will remain chosen if Vx0 increases and/or V0x decreases.
A.2.2 Condorcet-Bucklin (§ 1.5) is monotonic
See Tideman 2006, p. 204.
A.2.3 Instant Runoff (§ 1.6) is not monotonic
See Tideman 2006, p. 194.
A.2.4 Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is not monotonic
The following counterexample was already referred to in Camps, Mora,
Saumell 2012, § 12:
1 : a>d>b>e>c, 1 : b>a>c>e>d, 1 : b>c>a>d>e,
1 : b>c>d>e>a, 1 : b>e>c>a>d, 1 : d>a>b>c>e,
2 : e>a>c>d>b, 1 : e>c>a>d>b, 1 : b>d>c>a>e,
(21)
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The resulting preference scores and path scores are as follows:
(Vxy)=
a 5 5 7 5
5 b 7 5 7
5 3 c 7 5
3 5 3 d 5
5 3 5 5 e
, (V ∗xy)=
a 5 5 7 5
5 b 7 7 7
5 5 c 7 5
5 5 5 d 5
5 5 5 5 e
. (22)
As one can see, there are quite a few pairs xy such that V ∗xy = V
∗
yx = 5. As
a consequence, it turns out that the relation ∗ that we defined in §A.1 is a
whole tie. The set of path-top choices is therefore the whole of A. Assume
now that the last ballot in (21) is modified by replacing b > d by d > b.
The monotonicity property requires d to continue being a path-top choice.
However, it is not so. In fact, one gets a as the only path-top choice.
A.2.5 Strong Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is monotonic
See Schulze 2011, § 4.5. The result is easily obtained from (20) by checking
that the situation x  y —i. e. the inequality V ∗xy > V ∗yx— is preserved when
the Llull entries of the form Vxa increase or stay the same and those of the
form Vax decrease or stay the same.
A.2.6 The Swiss Procedures (§ 1.1) are monotonic
Assume that x has been chosen by one of the Swiss procedures (Bern or
Nidwalden). To start with, this requires it to be collectively aproved, i. e. to
satisfy Vx0 > V0x . This condition is certainly preserved under the considered
modifications of the Llull matrix. The condition of maximizing the Copeland
count is also preserved (Tideman 2006, p. 206). Finally, Bern’s condition of
maximizing the sum
∑
y 6=x Vxy will also be preserved, as well as Nidwalden’s
condition of maximizing Vx0 − V0x .
A.2.7 Preference-Approval Voting (§ 1.8) is monotonic
See Brams, Sanver 2009, § 5 or Brams 2008, § 3.5. The case with ties of
the form Vxy = Vyx can be dealt with by means of the results of Brandt,
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Brill, Harrenstein 2018.
A.2.8 Approval Voting with a Runoff (§ 1.8) is monotonic
See Sanver 2010, Thm. 20.4.1.
A.3 Upper semicontinuity
As it was explained in Section 1.7, this property is about small variations
of the profile. Recall that the profile of a vote means a specification of the
frequency of every possible way to fill in the ballot. So we can represent it
as an element of RK+ , where K is the number of possible ways to fill in the
ballot.
Let X(U) ⊆ A denote the choice set associated with the profile U by a
given method. This method being upper semicontinuous means that every
profile U has a neighbourhood N in RK+ such that U˜ ∈ N implies X(U˜) ⊆
X(U).
In the following we will often make use of an equivalent formulation. For
every option x ∈ A, let Ω(x) denote the set of profiles U such that X(U)
contains x. When A is finite, as in our case, the upper semicontinuity of X is
equivalent to the closedness of Ω(x) for every x ∈ A (see for instance Klein,
Thompson 1984, § 7.1.4). That is, for every sequence of profiles Un (n =
1, 2, ...) that converges to a limit U , if Un ∈ Ω(x) for all n, then U ∈ Ω(x).
Obviously, the preference scores Vxy depend continuously on the profile
U . Therefore, for the methods that are based on the Llull matrix it suffices
to check for the upper semicontinuity with respect to this matrix. For such
methods we will denote by Γ(x) the set of Llull matrices V for which x is a
choice by the method under consideration.
Theorem. The path-revised approval choice is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let us assume that Γ(x) ∋ Vn → V. We want to see that V ∈ Γ(x).
This is easily checked by considering the inequalities (Vn)
∗
x0 − (Vn)∗0x ≥
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(Vn)
∗
y0 − (Vn)∗0y that appear in the definition of x being a path-revised ap-
proval choice, and using the fact that the path scores are continuous functions
of the original preference scores.
A.3.1 Approval Choice (§ 1.3) is upper semicontinuous
Let us assume that Γ(x) ∋ Vn → V. We want to see that V ∈ Γ(x). This is
easily checked by considering the inequalities (Vn)x0−(Vn)0x ≥ (Vn)y0−(Vn)0y
that appear in the definition of x being an approval choice and letting n tend
to ∞ .
A.3.2 Condorcet-Bucklin (§ 1.5) is not upper semicontinuous
The following is easily checked to be a counterexample, both for the
version where majorities are understood in the strict sense and for that where
they are understood in the weak sense: 3 + ǫ : c>a> b | , 4 − ǫ : b>a>
c | , 1 : a>c>b | .
A.3.3 Instant Runoff (§ 1.6) is upper semicontinuous
Let us assume that Ω(x) ∋ Un → U. We want to see that U ∈ Ω(x). For
every n there exists a sequence of N − 1 eliminations that leads to x, where
N denotes the number of options. Since the sequences of N − 1 options
form a finite set, one can assume —by extracting a subsequence of the Un—
that the sequence of eliminations is the same for all n. Let a be the first
eliminated option, b the second one, and so on.
Option a being eligible for the first elimination means that φ(a;Un) ≤
φ(z;Un) for all z ∈ A \ {a} , where φ(z;U) stands for the number of first
places of z as a function of the profile U . Now, for every z ∈ A, φ(z;U)
depends continuously on U . Therefore, by letting n→∞ we get φ(a;U) ≤
φ(z;U) for all z ∈ A \ {a} .
Similarly, option b being eligible for the second elimination means that
φ(b | a;Un) ≤ φ(z | a;Un) for all z ∈ A \ {a, b} , where φ(z | a;U) stands for
the number of first places of z after having eliminated a as a function of the
profile U . Again the continuous dependence on the profile allows to derive
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the same inequality for the limiting profile U .
By repeating the same argument, we see that the limiting profile U admits
the same sequence of eliminations, and therefore admits x as a choice.
A.3.4 Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is upper semicontinuous
Let T (V ) denote the set of path-top choices as a function of the Llull
matrix V . Let us assume that Γ(x) ∋ Vn → V. We want to see that V ∈
Γ(x), that is, x ∗V y for any y 6= x (where the subindex indicates which
Llull matrix are we talking about). We know that x ∗Vn y . This means that
for every n there exists a path x0x1 . . . xm of length m ≤ N (N being the
number of options) from x0 = x to xm = y such that (Vn)
∗
xixi+1
≥ (Vn)∗xi+1xi
for all i. The path in question may depend on n. However, since the possible
paths are finite in number, we can assume —by extracting a subsequence—
that we are dealing with the same path for all n. Now, since the path
scores are continuous functions of the original preference scores, the preceding
non-strict inequalities remain true in the limit n → ∞ , which ensures that
x ∗V y , as we wanted to show.
A.3.5 Strong Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is upper semicontinuous
Let S(V ) denote the set of strong path-top choices as a function of the
Llull matrix V . Let us assume that Γ(x) ∋ Vn → V. We want to see that
V ∈ Γ(x), that is, x  V y for any y 6= x. We know that x  Vn y .
This means that for every n one has (Vn)
∗
xy ≥ (Vn)∗yx . Now, since the path
scores are continuous functions of the original preference scores, the preceding
non-strict inequalities remain true in the limit n → ∞ , which ensures that
x  V y , as we wanted to show.
A.3.6 The Swiss Procedures (§ 1.1) are not upper semicontinuous
As we saw in Section 1.7, (3) is a counterexample if majorities are under-
stood in the strict sense, and (5) is a counterexample both for the version
where majorities are understood in the strict sense and for that where they
are understood in the weak sense.
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A.3.7 Preference-Approval Voting (§ 1.8) is not upper semicon-
tinuous
Examples (3) and (5) are again counterexamples.
A.3.8 Approval Voting with a Runoff (§ 1.8) is upper semicon-
tinuous
Let us assume that Γ(x) ∋ Vn → V. We want to see that V ∈ Γ(x).
We know that, for every n, there exists z 6= x such that (Vn)x0 − (Vn)0x ≥
(Vn)t0−(Vn)0t and (Vn)z0−(Vn)0z ≥ (Vn)t0−(Vn)0t for all t /∈ { x, z } ; besides,
(Vn)xz ≥ (Vn)zx. In principle z may depend on n. However, by extracting
a subsequence we can assume that it is the same for all n. Once more, the
desired result follows by letting n→∞ .
A.4 Pareto consistency
As in Section 2.4.5, here we make the standing assumption that the votes have
the form of truncated rankings with the possibility of ties. We also assume
that such votes are interpreted as in the following way (see Section 1.9):
a vote where two options x and y are really ranked equally with each other
is assimilated to half a vote where x is preferred to y together with half
another vote with the reverse preference; any unranked option is less preferred
than any ranked one; nothing is inferred about the preference between two
unranked options.
An option x will be said to dominate another one y in the sense of
Pareto when every voter either prefers x to y or ranks them equally, but at
least one voter strictly prefers x to y . By definition, a choice method being
strongly Pareto consistent means that it never chooses an option that
is dominated by another. In contrast, weak Pareto consistency means
the follwoing: if x dominates y and y is a possible choice, then x is also a
possible choice.
Lemma. The following inequalities hold whenever x dominates y in the
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sense of Pareto:
Vxy > Vyx (23)
Vxa ≥ Vya, Vax ≤ Vay, for any a ∈ A \ { x, y }. (24)
V ∗xy ≥ V ∗yx (25)
V ∗xa ≥ V ∗ya, V ∗ax ≤ V ∗ay, for any a ∈ A \ { x, y }. (26)
Proof. Consider all possibilities for the preferences about x, y and a in a
truncated ranking that expresses either x > y or x ∼ y . Altogether, there
are nine such possibilities, which are collected in Table 1. Notice that the
truncated rankings might not show explicitly all the information that is given
here; for instance, a truncated ranking that says “x > y” without mentioning
a belongs to possibility 1; in particular, possibility 6 corresponds to a trun-
cated ranking that mentions neither y nor a. For each possibility, the table
shows the contribution of a vote of that kind to each of the preference scores
Vxa, Vax, Vya and Vay . Therefore, if αk ≥ 0 denotes the number of votes of
type k , one has Vxa =
∑
k αkv
(k)
xa , and analogously for Vax, Vya and Vay .
k preferences v
(k)
xa v
(k)
ya v
(k)
ax v
(k)
ay
1 x > y > a 1 1 0 0
2 x > y ∼ a 1 1
2
0 1
2
3 x > a > y 1 0 0 1
4 a ∼ x > y 1
2
0 1
2
1
5 a > x > y 0 0 1 1
6 x > y, a 1 0 0 0
7 x ∼ y > a 1 1 0 0
8 x ∼ a ∼ y 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
9 a > x ∼ y 0 0 1 1
Table 2: The nine possibilities for the preferences about
x, y and a when x dominates y in the sense of Pareto.
The inequalities (24) are an immediate consequence of the fact that they
hold for every k . Let us consider now the first of the inequalities (26). In
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order to arrive at it, one can proceed in the following way,
V ∗ya = min (Vya1 , Va1a2 , . . . , Van−1a)
≤ min (Vxa1 , Va1a2 , . . . , Van−1a) ≤ V ∗xa,
(27)
where y a1a2 . . . an−1a is a path that realizes the maximum that defines V
∗
ya
—see equation (7) of the article— and we have used the first of the inequal-
ities (24). An analogous argument yields the second of the inequalities (26).
Finally, inequality (25) can be obtained in the following way: if V ∗yx = Vyx,
it suffices to notice that V ∗yx = Vyx < Vxy ≤ V ∗xy, where the central strict
inequality is an immediate consequence of the hypothesis that x dominates
y in the sense of Pareto; otherwise, one can write
V ∗yx = min (Vya1 , Va1a2 , . . . , Van−1x)
≤ min (Vxa1 , Va1a2 , . . . , Van−1y) ≤ V ∗xy,
(28)
where y a1a2 . . . an−1x is a path that realizes the maximum that defines V
∗
yx ,
and we have used both inequalities (24).
In the remainer of this section we assume that x dominates y in the sense
of Pareto.
Theorem. The set of path-revised approval choices is weakly Pareto consis-
tent.
Proof. It suffices to notice that the inequalities (26) with a = 0 entail the
inequality
V ∗x0 − V ∗0x ≥ V ∗y0 − V ∗0y. (29)
This inequality ensures that y cannot be chosen without x being chosen
too.
A.4.1 Approval Choice (§ 1.3) is weakly Pareto consistent
The inequalities (24) with a = 0 result in Vx0−V0x ≥ Vy0−V0y, which en-
tais that y cannot be chosen without x being chosen too. The strong version
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of Pareto consistency is not satisfied since the Approval Choice disregards
any preferential information.
A.4.2 Condorcet-Bucklin (§ 1.5) is strongly Pareto consistent
Condorcet-Bucklin assumes truncated rankings without ties. The hypoth-
esis of the Pareto condition entails that y cannot have first placings at all.
The only way for y to win is having a majority of k -th placings or better for
some k ≥ 2, but in that case x will have a majority of (k − 1)-th placings
or better.
A.4.3 Instant Runoff (§ 1.6) is strongly Pareto consistent
Again, Instant Runoff assumes truncated rankings which entails that y
cannot have any first placings. So y is one of the candidates to be eliminated.
It the eliminated option is another one, it must be also an option with no
first placings. After this elimination we are again in the situation where
y has no first placings. Since there are only a finite number of options, y
will eventually be the only option with no first placings, and then it will be
eliminated.
A.4.4 Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is weakly Pareto consistent
This is an immediate consequence of inequality (25). In fact, according
to §A.1, this inequality says that x  y . Therefore, having y ∗ z for any
z 6= y implies x ∗ z for any z 6= x.
A.4.5 Strong Path-Top Choice (§A.1) is weakly Pareto consistent
See Schulze 2011, § 4.3.2. The weak version of Pareto consistency is an
immediate consequence of the inequalities (25) and (26) together with the
equality that defines the set of strong path-top choices, namely S = { x |
V ∗xy ≥ V ∗yx, ∀y 6= x } .
As far as we know, there is no proof nor a counterexample of the strong
version of Pareto consistency.
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A.4.6 The Swiss Procedures (§ 1.1) are strongly Pareto consistent
Assume that x dominates y in the sense of Pareto. Assume also that y
is chosen. To begin with, this requires Vy0 − V0y ≥ 0. By (24), this implies
Vx0− V0x ≥ 0. So both x and y and possibly some other non-default option
are considered in the second step where the Copeland rule is applied. Now
inequalities (23) and (24) entail that x wins y under Copeland rule. So y
cannot be chosen.
A.4.7 Preference-Approval Voting (§ 1.8) is weakly Pareto con-
sistent
The inequalities (24) entail that the approval information will select x
whenever it selects y . Now, inequality Vxy > Vyx ensures that y cannot be
a Condorcet winner. On the other hand, it also entails that x will be in the
top cycle whenever y is there. Therefore we are led back to the approval
scores. Again, the approval information will select x whenever it selects y .
The strong version of Pareto consistency is not satisfied. A counterexam-
ple is the following: 20 x ∼ y>z>t | , 20 t>x ∼ y>z | , 20 z>t>x ∼ y | ,
1 t > z > x> y | . As one can check, the Preference-Approval Voting choice
includes all options in spite of the fact that x dominates y .
A.4.8 Approval Voting with a Runoff (§ 1.8) is weakly Pareto
consistent
Option y being a winner entails that there exists z so that Vy0 − V0y ≥
Vt0 − V0t and Vz0 − V0z ≥ Vt0 − V0t for any t 6= y, z . The inequality that is
claimed in A.4.1 shows that either (a) z = x or (b) Vz0 − V0z ≥ Vy0 − V0y =
Vx0−V0x ≥ Vt0−V0t for any t 6= x, y, z . In case (a) the inequality Vxy > Vyx
entails that x is the only winner. In case (b) the pair x, z is as entitled as
y, z for the runoff, and the inequalities (24) entail that Vxz−Vzx ≥ Vyz−Vzy ,
so that y cannot be chosen (from {y, z}) without x being also chosen (from
{x, z}).
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A.5 Condorcet’s last desideratum
In this section we prove the following statement made in § 2.4.4, where the
term ‘confidence’ should be understood in the sense of § 2.2: if x is a path-
revised approval choice and y is not, then the confidence that x is preferable
to the default option is greater than or equal to the confidence that y is
preferable to x; besides, this inequality is strict as soon as the path-revised
approval choice is a proper one. This statement is an immediate corollary of
the theorem below.
Lemma 1. V ∗xz ≥ min (V ∗xy, V ∗yz) for any pairwise different x, y, z .
Proof. This follows from the definition of the path scores —equations (7–8)—
by considering the path from x to z which is obtained by concatenating those
from x to y and from y to z that produce the respective values of V ∗xy and
V ∗yz .
Lemma 2. If V ∗yz > V
∗
xz , then V
∗
xz ≥ V ∗xy . If V ∗xy > V ∗xz , then V ∗xz ≥ V ∗yz .
Proof. These implications are immediate consequences of Lemma 1.
Theorem. If V ∗x0 − V ∗0x ≥ 0 and V ∗x0 − V ∗0x > V ∗y0 − V ∗0y , then V ∗x0 − V ∗0x ≥
V ∗yx − V ∗xy . If the first inequality is strict, then the last one is also strict.
Proof. Consider for the moment the first statement, where the first and
third inequalities are not strict. We will argue by contradiction. More specif-
ically, we will arrive at contradiction from the following inequalities
V ∗x0 ≥˙ V ∗0x, (30)
V ∗x0 + V
∗
0y > V
∗
0x + V
∗
y0, (31)
V ∗0x + V
∗
yx >˙ V
∗
x0 + V
∗
xy, (32)
where these inequalities are equivalent respectively to the two inequalities of
the hypothesis and to the negation of the conclusion. The dots that appear on
top of some inequality signs indicate that these signs should be switched from
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“≥” to “>” and viceversa to prove the statement about strict inequalities.
We will distinguish two cases: (a) V ∗x0 ≥ V ∗yx ; (b) V ∗yx > V ∗x0 .
Case (a). Here we are assuming that
V ∗x0 ≥ V ∗yx. (33)
This implies that min(V ∗yx, V
∗
x0) = V
∗
yx . Therefore, by Lemma 1,
V ∗y0 ≥ V ∗yx. (34)
Now, by concatenating (31), (34) and (32), we get
V ∗x0 + V
∗
0y > V
∗
0x + V
∗
y0 ≥ V ∗0x + V ∗yx >˙ V ∗x0 + V ∗xy. (35)
Therefore,
V ∗0y > V
∗
xy, (36)
and, by Lemma 2,
V ∗xy ≥ V ∗x0. (37)
Finally, by concatenating (33), (32) and (37), we get
V ∗0x + V
∗
x0 ≥ V ∗0x + V ∗yx >˙ V ∗x0 + V ∗xy ≥ 2V ∗x0, (38)
that is V ∗0x >˙ V
∗
x0 , in contradiction with (30).
Case (b). Here we are assuming that
V ∗yx > V
∗
x0. (39)
This implies that min(V ∗yx, V
∗
x0) = V
∗
x0 . Therefore, by Lemma 1,
V ∗y0 ≥ V ∗x0. (40)
Now, by concatenating (31) and (40), we get
V ∗x0 + V
∗
0y > V
∗
0x + V
∗
y0 ≥ V ∗0x + V ∗x0. (41)
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Therefore,
V ∗0y > V
∗
0x, (42)
and, by Lemma 2,
V ∗0x ≥ V ∗yx. (43)
However, by combining this inequality with (39) we get a contradiction
with (30).
This completes the proof of the statement with non-strict inequalities.
The reader will easily check that switching between “≥” to “>” in the dotted
inequality signs takes care of the statement with strict inequalities.
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